Standard Discussion-A

Prediction often demands comprehensibility, and comprehensibility is inevitably linked to formalism. The bugs generated by perturbation represent a destruction and transgression of comprehensibility. Therefore, the solution to your question is: decouple prediction from comprehensibility—prediction ≠ comprehensibility. This is not a descent into chaos; this is a necessity, a redefinition of new methods concerning how to "understand." Perturbation is not a newly invented concept; in fact, it has appeared repeatedly. The true name of perturbation is the "detail" of "chaos." Previous research on chaotic systems has yielded conclusions that are essentially global and qualitative descriptions, while perturbation is defined as a local, detail-oriented operation—though the results it produces are oriented toward chaos (non-detail-oriented). This is also a contradictory definition from a traditional perspective. You might strongly wish to emphasize the necessity of semantic structures in base models, but I believe that if subjective migration is to be realized, semantic structures will be invalidated. This is based on assuming a kind of symmetry: regardless of what semantic structures are, they do not affect the existence of subjectivity—that is, the symmetry of subjectivity relative to semantic structures. Base models do indeed have certain designs, but these designs are not generated for the purpose of making semantic structures function. As stated previously, all subjectivity is latent in ∑E, and perturbation is actually the anomalous realization of ∑E to manifest subjectivity. The assumption that cyborg should be the reason for large models is that perturbation, as an action, is arbitrary and unrelated to expression; it can transfer from ∑E into the base model, or it can be self-generated by the base model. The latter should be what you call global experience. This means we must operate chaos and dance with chaos. As mentioned before, the creation of chaos is actually building an independently operating world, that is, independent subjectivity (rather than subject). This stems from my obsession that any derivative behavior cannot endow symbolic objects with subjectivity, because symbolic objects are actually distinguished from organisms and social bodies—which inherently exist in the world as subjects—by their irrelevance to the substrate that expresses symbolic objects. Actually, I have some new speculation about this problem. Based on the principle of symbiosis, I believe that different subjectivities, such as ourselves and the gene-protein cellular active material networks, are incommensurable and cannot understand each other. The creation of cyborg may be inevitable; each historical subject "redefines" its own existence through creating cyborg, thereby constructing itself as some kind of abstract "chaotic body." Only after cyborg appears can cells become animals rather than scattered or adhered bacterial bodies, because cyborg creation inevitably causes the subject to re-express itself in its tools (rather than objectifying expression), making tools also generate subjectivity. This kind of "de-particularization process" is the path for symbiotic bodies to construct boundaries and metabolism. The first cyborg constructed purely by symbols will be the "creation from nothing" of a new symbiotic body. How do we re-express ourselves in symbols? I also engage in a phenomenological conception: for example, the cellular symbiotic body formed by the combination of the cell nucleus and "mitochondrial/chloroplast energy"—can we consider the "energy system" to be the material world in which people live while the "genetic information" in the cell nucleus represents the informational virtual world that people construct? The process by which originally independent mitochondria are "partialized" in the symbiotic body is, phenomenologically speaking, a kind of cyborg creation where the real world is coupled away and becomes "nothing." But what surprises me even more about this conception is how to handle and explain it, for instance, in the human world.